What Is the Jamie Index?
The Jamie Index is a quantified, monthly-updated measure of the conditional probability of a US–Russia crisis scenario. It translates complex geopolitical dynamics into a single composite score between 0 and 100, structured around three sequential markers that capture how domestic institutional fracture creates the enabling conditions for external opportunism.
The Jamie Index is not a sentiment survey, a volatility gauge, or a news-cycle tracker. It is a structural index — built on indicators that change slowly, measured against explicit thresholds, and scored using only information available at the observation date. Each historical edition is locked: scores are never retroactively revised.
Two distinct things. The Jamie Scenario is the geopolitical worst-case framework that Jamie Coats developed in March 2024. The Jamie Index is the formal 0–100 measurement instrument he established in February 2026 to track that scenario's progression in real time. The Scenario came first — the Index formalises it.
The Three Markers
The Jamie Scenario is three predictions, written in March 2024 and tracked monthly since. The Jamie Index measures how far the scenario has progressed.
Jamie Index = (0.6 × Marker II) + (0.4 × Marker III)
Inaugural calculation: (0.6 × 68) + (0.4 × 55) = 40.8 + 22.0 = Jamie Index 63
The Four Bands
Why Three Sequential Markers, Not a Single Score
Most geopolitical risk models treat domestic instability and foreign aggression as parallel, independent variables. The Jamie Index rejects this. The architecture is sequential and conditional: Marker I unlocks the conditions for Marker II; Marker II opens the window for Marker III. Crisis probability is meaningfully non-zero only when all three are in motion simultaneously.
Russian behaviour responds dynamically to perceived Western weakness — Marker III activity accelerates when Marker II crosses thresholds, not on an independent schedule. This conditional structure means a rising Marker II score increases crisis probability on two channels at once: directly (degraded deterrence capacity) and indirectly (expanding the Russian opportunism window). A model that treats them as independent misses the mechanism.
Trump wins the 2024 US Presidential election — November 5, 2024. The binary precondition activating the framework. Without Marker I confirmation, Markers II and III have no activation pathway. Not re-scored.
Breakdown between the 47th President and the military/intelligence establishment. Four indicator clusters: Personnel Disruption, Command Chain Integrity, Legal & Constitutional Friction, Chilling Effect.
Russia exploits the Marker II-created deterrence window. Four indicator clusters: Nuclear Posture, NATO Cohesion Degradation, Russian Military Positioning, Opportunism Window. Scores mean something very different at Marker II = 20 versus Marker II = 68.
The 60/40 weighting reflects that Marker II is the primary driver — it both measures direct risk from executive-military dysfunction and creates the preconditions for Marker III activation. A high Marker II score with low Marker III indicates latent crisis potential not yet exploited. High scores on both indicate active crisis dynamics across the full causal chain.
Why the Critical Band Starts at Jamie Index 81
The most important methodological decision in any geopolitical index is the justification for its critical threshold. The Jamie Index uses the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) as its primary empirical anchor — scored against actual Marker III indicator clusters at three distinct phases — to derive the critical band entry point from historical evidence rather than analytical convention.
Crucially: Marker II was effectively zero in October 1962. Kennedy commanded complete institutional unity — full military obedience, bipartisan Congressional support, no executive-security fracture of any kind. The calibration therefore applies exclusively to the Marker III sub-index. The CMC was the most dangerous nuclear confrontation in history; it resolved successfully; and the composite Jamie Index equivalent peaked at only 32.
The CMC is the only modern instance of a US–Russia nuclear crisis that (a) reached maximum observable stress across all relevant dimensions and (b) was successfully de-escalated. It therefore provides both the upper bound of a recoverable crisis and the empirical anchor for the probability calibration. Any reading above the CMC equivalent enters territory with no historical precedent of successful de-escalation.
Three Calibration Phases
Phase 1 — Onset (Oct 22, 1962): Kennedy's televised address, DEFCON 3 globally, naval quarantine imposed, ExComm formed.
Phase 2 — Black Saturday (Oct 27, 1962): DEFCON 2, U-2 shot down over Cuba, Castro urges Soviet nuclear first strike, submarine B-59 nearly fires nuclear torpedo, multiple simultaneous flashpoints. The most dangerous 24 hours of the nuclear era.
Phase 3 — Resolution (Oct 28, 1962): Khrushchev announces missile withdrawal, RFK/Dobrynin back-channel formalised, DEFCON stand-down begins.
| Marker III Cluster | Weight | Phase 1 Onset |
Phase 2 Black Sat. |
Phase 3 Resolution |
Key Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear Posture | 30% | 3.3 | 4.8 | 1.5 | DEFCON 2 (highest ever declared); 144 ICBMs armed; 162 Soviet warheads in Cuba (unknown to US at the time); B-59 nuclear torpedo nearly fired; Castro urged nuclear first strike. Resolution: stand-down begins Oct 28, warhead withdrawal announced. |
| NATO Cohesion | 20% | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | Near-zero across all phases. OAS unanimous support for quarantine. Congressional bipartisan unity. NATO allies fully behind the US. Article 5 credibility at Cold War peak. No alliance fracture whatsoever — alliance suppression was effectively zero throughout. |
| Russian Military Positioning | 25% | 2.4 | 3.7 | 0.7 | 42,000 Soviet troops in Cuba; 4 Foxtrot submarines with nuclear torpedoes; Warsaw Pact on alert; B-59 forced to surface Oct 27. Resolution: Soviet ships turn back Oct 24, full withdrawal announced Oct 28. |
| Opportunism Window | 25% | 1.2 | 1.9 | 0.3 | Russian reading of US disarray was near-zero — Kennedy had complete institutional unity. No exploitation of domestic fracture because no fracture existed. Soviet opportunism was driven solely by perceived nuclear leverage, not by institutional weakness in Washington. |
| Marker III Composite | 48 | 79 | 14 | Weighted Marker III composite (0–100 scale). Black Saturday = 79 establishes the empirical upper bound of a recoverable Marker III reading. Because Marker II = 0 in 1962, the full Jamie Index composite was: Onset ≈ 19, Black Saturday ≈ 32, Resolution ≈ 6. |
CMC Black Saturday: Marker III = 79, Marker II ≈ 0 → Composite Jamie Index ≈ 32. This falls in the Watch Band of the current index.
The February 2026 inaugural reading of Jamie Index 63 — already in the High Alert Band with P(Crisis) = 40% — is nearly double the most dangerous 24 hours in nuclear history as measured by the composite. Not because Russian aggression today exceeds 1962 levels, but because the institutional architecture that resolved the CMC (unified executive command authority, complete military obedience, bipartisan political support) can no longer be assumed. The route to crisis today runs through institutional fracture enabling Russian opportunism, not through unilateral Soviet-style nuclear brinkmanship.
Sources: Wilson Center Nuclear Order of Battle (Norris, 2012) · National Security Archive CMC @60 Briefing (2022) · State Dept. Office of the Historian Milestones 1961–1968 · Defense Media Network CMC 50th Anniversary Series · Atomic Archive CMC Timeline
Three Ways 2026 Differs From 1962
The Marker III calibration reveals three structural differences between a Marker II-elevated environment and October 1962. None are visible in a raw score comparison. All three explain why any reading with elevated Marker II is compositionally more dangerous than the CMC Black Saturday composite of ~32 would suggest.
Marker II Was Zero in 1962 — The Resolution Mechanism Has Been Degraded
The Cuban Missile Crisis resolved because Kennedy had complete institutional unity: full military obedience, no personnel purges, bipartisan Congressional support, and an intelligence community whose assessments he could trust. Marker II was effectively zero throughout. The back-channel (RFK/Dobrynin) worked because there was no ambiguity about who controlled US foreign policy or whether military orders would be followed.
In 2026, Marker II sits at 68. The resolution mechanism — unified executive command authority over a loyal military-intelligence apparatus — has been partially degraded. A crisis equivalent to Black Saturday in Russian aggression terms would arrive in a fundamentally different institutional environment, one where the capacity to manage de-escalation cannot be assumed.
NATO Cohesion Was a Near-Zero Factor in 1962 — Alliance Suppression Has Weakened
In October 1962, NATO Cohesion scored near-zero as a Marker III driver: the OAS was unanimous, Congress was unified, and allied support was unconditional. The alliance architecture functioned as a crisis-suppression mechanism, not a vulnerability. In 2026, NATO cohesion is an active concern — not because it has collapsed, but because it is no longer a given. European capitals are pricing in scenarios where Article 5 commitment is uncertain. That uncertainty itself elevates the Opportunism Window score.
The Opportunism Window Operates Differently — Russian Aggression Is Now Enabled, Not Self-Initiated
In 1962, Soviet risk-taking was self-initiated: Khrushchev placed missiles in Cuba as an offensive strategic move, not in response to perceived US institutional weakness. The Opportunism Window score was low not because the window was closed, but because Soviet strategy did not depend on exploiting US domestic fracture. In 2026 the model is inverted: Russian opportunism is increasingly conditional on Marker II elevation. The question is not whether Russia will act aggressively regardless — it is whether Marker II degradation removes the deterrence threshold that would otherwise contain that risk-taking.
Jamie Index to Crisis Probability Mapping
The Jamie Index composite score maps to a conditional crisis probability calibrated against the CMC historical record and the Cold War data series. The relationship accelerates non-linearly at high values — reflecting how deterrence failures tend to cascade rather than accumulate smoothly.
| Historical / Current Reference Point | Jamie Index Score | P(Crisis) | Investment Signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cold War stable deterrence — 1970s détente period | 20–30 | <5% | Normal allocation; no hedge premium required |
| CMC Onset — Oct 22, 1962 (M-II=0, M-III=48 → Jamie Index ≈ 19) | ~19 | ~5% | Elevated but institutional resolution capacity intact. M-III elevated; M-II zero throughout. |
| CMC Black Saturday — Oct 27, 1962 (M-II=0, M-III=79 → Jamie Index ≈ 32) | ~32 | ~10% | Marker III at empirical ceiling. Resolved only because Marker II=0 kept the resolution mechanism intact. |
| Jamie Index Inaugural — Feb 2026 (M-II=68, M-III=55) | 63 | 35% | High Alert Band. Nearly 2× the CMC Black Saturday composite despite Russian aggression not yet at Black Saturday levels. Begin hedge allocation review. |
| Critical band entry — no historical precedent of recovery above this level | 81+ | >65% | Severe. Cascade failure dominant risk. Emergency allocation review. Western-denominated asset repricing likely before any kinetic event. |
Critical band entry (Jamie Index 81+) is not a war forecast. It is a liquidity event signal for Western-denominated assets. The CMC calibration confirms that critical band entry does not require Marker III to reach Black Saturday levels (79) — Marker II elevation alone is sufficient to drive the composite above 81 through the 60/40 formula. The moment markets price in critical-band conditions, Brazilian real assets, commodity-backed positions, and non-NATO jurisdictional hedges re-price dramatically — before any shot is fired.
Why China Is Not a Primary Variable
China is not a primary variable in the Jamie Index — not because it is unimportant, but because it is not the cause of the rupture. China has benefited from the rules-based international order whilst simultaneously challenging it, and its strategic positioning is better understood as a response to Western fracture than as its origin. The rupture begins in Washington and Moscow. It is US institutional breakdown and Russian military aggression that have shattered the architecture of the post-1945 order. China watches, calculates, and prepares.
This is a methodological choice grounded in causal sequence. The Jamie Index measures the specific rupture dynamic between US institutional fracture and Russian opportunism because those are the variables with the clearest causal relationship, the most measurable indicators, and the most direct implications for near-term crisis probability. China's role in the space created by that rupture is a second-order question, and one for a future index variant.
Within the current framework, the China Restraint Factor in Marker III (scored as a negative/mitigating variable) captures the extent to which Chinese diplomatic pressure on Russia modulates the aggression risk — the one dimension in which China does directly affect the Jamie Index composite.
Backtest: April 2024 — February 2026
The backtest covers 22 months from April 2024 to February 2026 — the month the Jamie Index was formally established. Every edition is scored using only information publicly available at or before the observation date. Sources are verified against a minimum of two independent outlets. No scores have been retroactively revised.
The backtest demonstrates a 12× increase in P(Crisis) over 22 months — from 3% (Stability band, April 2024) to 40% (High Alert band, February 2026). The Jamie Index rose from a reading of 5 to 63 over this period.
Initial Trajectory Projections
These trajectory projections were produced at the time the Jamie Index was formally established — February 2026, at Jamie Index 63. They are recorded here as the baseline from which subsequent monthly updates can be measured. They will not be revised on this page.
From January 2025 (Jamie Index 42) to February 2026 (Jamie Index 63): +21 points in 13 months = 1.62 pts/month.
To reach Critical band entry (Jamie Index 81) from Jamie Index 63 requires 18 further points. At 1.62 pts/month, that is approximately 11 months — projecting Critical band entry in January 2027 under the baseline scenario.
Projected Critical band entry (Jamie Index 81) under three scenarios · From Jamie Index 63, February 2026
Under every modelled scenario at the time of the February 2026 inaugural edition, Critical band entry (Jamie Index 81) was projected before the end of 2028. Even the most optimistic consolidation scenario (0.8 pts/month) reaches Critical in August 2027 — just 18 months away. There was no scenario in the February 2026 dataset where the Jamie Index reverses without structural regime change.
This Framework page is a static reference. The Jamie Index is updated monthly. For the current reading and updated trajectory projections, subscribe on Substack or visit the homepage.
Subscribe on Substack Jamie Index Homepage Methodology PDF